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Abstract
Natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth win-
ners, and the main diﬀerence between the success cases and the cases of failure lays
in the quality of institutions. With grabber friendly institutions more natural re-
sources push aggregate income down, while with producer friendly institutions more
natural resources increase income. Such a theory ﬁnds strong support in data. A key
question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions.
When that is the case, countries with bad institutions suﬀer a double resource curse
- as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative eﬀect of more natural
resources.
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1 Introduction
Imagine that a valuable natural resource is suddenly discovered both in Afghanistan
and Switzerland. What would the economic consequences in each of the two coun-
tries be? Would the new wealth turn out to be a curse or a blessing?
Resource booms often become a curse rather than a blessing. In many cases it
hampers economic and political development. On average resource rich economies
have lower growth1, worse institutions, and more conﬂict than resource poor
economies.2 Thus empirically, being rich in natural resources is associated with
being poor in material wealth – the ’paradox of plenty’.
Behind this pattern we ﬁnd the usual suspects such as oil rich Angola, Nigeria,
Sudan, and Venezuela; diamond rich Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo; in addition
to narcotic states like Colombia and Afghanistan. Countries like these clearly per-
form poorly. Less attention is devoted to good performers among the resource rich
countries. Several countries that are doing well today, became prosperous because
of, rather than in spite of, their natural resources. The positive economic develop-
ment of Australia, Canada, the US, New Zealand, Iceland, and the Scandinavian
countries was stimulated by natural resource abundance. In a World Bank study
ﬁve of the top eight countries, according to natural resource wealth, were also among
the top 15 according to income.3
For example, by 1913 the US ”was the world’s dominant producer of virtually
every one of the major industrial minerals of that era”; and ”[r]esource abundance
was a signiﬁcant factor in shaping if not propelling the U.S. path to world leadership
1This was demonstrated in the seminal paper by Sachs and Warner (1995). Further evidence
can be found in Sachs and Warner (1997a,b), Gylfason et al. (1999), Auty (2001), and Papyrakis
and Gerlagh (2004).
2On institutions see Karl (1997), Ross (2001a), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Bulte et
al. (2005), Collier and Hoeﬄer (2005); on governance see Ross (2001b), Damania and Bulte (2003),
Murshed (2003); on civil conﬂict see Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), Ross (2004), Olsson (2004), Lujala
et al. (2005).
3See World Bank (1994).
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in manufacturing.”4 Similarly, ”late nineteenth century California was a resource
based economy with limited manufacturing, largely because the local market was
too small to support much industry. ..[T]he discovery of oil around the turn of
the century raised California to critical mass, starting it on a process of explosive
growth.”5
Also today there are growth winners among the resource rich countries.6 A
prominent example of a growth winner is diamond rich Botswana with the world’s
highest growth rate since 1960. Another growth winner is Norway, the world’s
third largest oil exporter. Norway started its oil extraction as late as 1973, and has
since had high economic growth also compared to the other Scandinavian countries.7
Chile, Brazil, and Australia are other recent examples where the mineral sector has
contributed positively to the economy.8 Peru, Malaysia, and Thailand are developing
countries that can be added to the list of resource rich countries that have avoided
the curse.9
The variation in performance of resource rich countries is also evident from the
Human Development Index (HDI). For example, there are close to forty countries
in the world with oil revenues that constitute at least thirty per cent of their export
earnings. Many of them have a substantially lower HDI rank than GDP rank. Yet
such an underperformance in human development is not true for all, as close to half
of these oil rich countries have a HDI rank equal to, or higher than, their GDP
rank.10
4Wright and Czelusta (2002, p. 9).
5Based on observerations of Paul Rhode (1980), cited from Krugman (1991, p. 28).
6Some authors even contest the claim that there is a negative relationsip between resource
abundance and average growth. See Stijns (2002) and Lederman and Maloney (2003).
7See for instance Røed Larsen (2003).
8See Wright and Czelusta (2002).
9See Abidin (2001).
10Bulte et al. (2005) argue that the negative eﬀects of resource abundance carry over to under-
nourishment, poverty and other human development indicators.
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How should we explain the diverging impact of natural resources on economic
development across countries? Why are some countries blessed and others cursed by
their resource wealth? We suggest that an important explanation can be found in
institutional diﬀerences. Measured by institutional and political indicators resource
rich countries again show huge variations. Those that do well economically, also
tend to score high on institutional and political indicators, and vice versa. Growth
winners, like Chile, Malaysia, and Thailand, rank ahead of growth losers as Algeria,
Ecuador, Mexico, Nigeria, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela, and Zambia.11 Moreover,
Botswana has the best African score on the Groningen Corruption Perception Index.
The economic consequences of discovering a new valuable resource are therefore
likely to be quite diﬀerent in warlord dominated Afghanistan and law obedient
Switzerland. This implies that countries that need more resources the most might
beneﬁt the least from such new wealth.
The aim of this paper is to explore and quantify the relationship between eco-
nomic growth, resource abundance, and institutional quality. The explanations we
suggest focus on the allocation of rents from natural resources. Resource rents may
be channeled into the productive economy, or they may be captured by the elite
for personal enrichment. Whether the rents stimulate the productive economy or
induce strategic jockeying among the elites, depends on the quality of institutions.
We claim that the quality of institutions determines whether natural resource abun-
dance is a blessing or a curse.
2 Links between institutions and the resource curse
The literature on the resource curse may be divided into three strands: One, where
the quality of institutions are hurt by resource abundance and constitutes the inter-
mediate causal link between resources and economic performance; another, where
11Robinson et al. (2005).
3
the institutions do not play an important role; yet another, where resources interact
with the quality of institutions such that resource abundance is a blessing when
institutions are good and a curse when institutions are bad.
1. Institutions as an intermediate causal link: This strand includes a large num-
ber of recent papers claiming that the main reason for the resource curse is a decay
of institutional quality in resource rich countries.
Concrete examples of destruction of institutions can be found in the many civil
wars over the control of natural resources as in Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, and Congo
– just to mention a few.12 If not leading to civil war, high resource incomes can
nevertheless lead to inferior political governance. Michael Ross, for example, shows
that oil dependency tend to hinder democracy. Resources aﬀect democracy over
an above what is explained by factors such as national income, geographical po-
sition, religion etc.13 This research has been extended to cover other measures of
institutional quality than the governance index used by Ross. Some studies have
in addition identiﬁed the negative eﬀect from resources, via institutional decay, to
economic growth.14
Other authors make a distinction between types of resources and ﬁnd that
economies, relying heavily on exports of fuels, minerals, and plantation crops (sugar),
score particularly low on a wide array of governance indicators. Similarly, resource
booms may tempt politicians to dismantle state institutions in order to extract funds
for own private purposes. Timber booms, for example, have led political insiders to
dissolve state forestry management in many countries, in particular in South-East
Asia.15 Something similar happened to the oil management in Venezuela.16
12Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004). The connection between resource abundance and civil conﬂict is
among the most active research ﬁelds on the resource curse, see Ross (2004) for an overview.
13Ross 2001b.
14Murshed (2003) and Gylfason and Zoega (2004).
15Ross (2001a) shows how.
16Karl (1997).
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While these cases are convincing enough, it is still an open question how much of
the resource curse they explain. Authors within the second strand of the literature
insists that institutional change explains very little of the resource curse.
2. Institutions have a neutral role. Within this strand we ﬁnd the seminal con-
tributions by Jeﬀrey Sachs and Andrew Warner analyzing data on resource avail-
ability, national incomes, investments, and institutional quality across countries in
the period 1970-1989. Sachs and Warner reject the hypothesis that institutions (or
bureaucratic quality) play a role in explaining the resource curse. When summariz-
ing their ﬁndings they state that ”the primary resource eﬀect does not appear [sic]
to work through the bureaucracy eﬀect. There is only weak evidence that primary
resource intensity is associated with poorer bureaucratic quality ...”17
What Sachs and Warner test is whether resource abundance leads to a deterio-
ration of institutional quality, which in turn lowers growth. Failing to ﬁnd empirical
support for this mechanism, they conclude that institutional quality cannot explain
the resource curse. They then revert to the ’Dutch disease’ explanation of the curse
as the empirically relevant one.
The conclusions of Sachs and Warner follow from the premise that the only
alternative to the ’Dutch disease’ hypothesis is the hypothesis that if institutions
play a role they do so as an intermediate causal link. Their analysis, however, does
not rule out the possibility that institutions play a role in the sense that resource
abundance becomes a curse only when institutions are bad. This alternative is the
third strand of the literature.
3. Resources interact with the quality of institutions: It may be that the presence
of rich natural resources in a country does not necessarily cause institutional decay.
Resource abundance may nevertheless put the institutional arrangements to a test.
17Sachs and Warner (1995, p. 19).
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Examples can be found in the disappointing economic performances following the
oil windfalls in Nigeria, Venezuela, and Mexico.18 Institutions may be persistent
and at the same time be an important part of the resource curse mechanism. In a
recent paper we show that what matters is the combination of resource abundance
and institutional quality.19 In that paper we investigate how the growth eﬀect of
resource abundance varies with institutional quality. We predict that in countries
with good institutions, resource abundance attracts entrepreneurs into production.
In countries with weak institutions, however, entrepreneurs are diverted away from
production and into unproductive rent appropriation.
3 A theory of institutions and the resource curse
In order to understand the impact of institutional quality we focus on the tension
between production and special forms of rent-seeking. All forms of rent-seeking may
be harmful to development, but not to the same degree. Here we make a distinction
between cases where rent-seeking and production are competing activities, and cases
where they are complimentary activities. Production and rent-seeking are competing
if the most eﬀective rent-seeking activities are located outside the productive part
of the economy – say, in the hands of political insiders, bureaucrats, robber barons,
or warlords.
Rent-seeking outside the productive economy pays of when institutions are bad:
Dysfunctional democracies invite political rent appropriation; low transparency in-
vites bureaucratic corruption; weak protection of property rights invite shady deal-
ings, unfair takeovers, and expropriation; weak protection of citizens’ rights invite
fraud and venal practices; weak rule of law invites crime, extortions, and maﬁa ac-
18Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) explain the weak performance by rent
seeking. Such rent seeking may also take the form of civil wars (Skaperdas 2002), see for instance
Olsson and Congdon Fors (2004) on the case of Congo.
19Mehlum et al. (2005b).
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tivities; a weak state invites warlordism. All these forms of direct wealth grabbing
are made possible by bad institutions — or ’grabber friendly’ institutions as we call
them. When institutions are grabber friendly, there is a disadvantage from being
a producer in the competition for natural resource rents. Hence, production and
rent-seeking are competing activities.
When institutions are better — or more ’producer friendly’ as we call them —
it is diﬃcult to be an eﬀective rent-seeker unless you also are a producer. Rule
of law, high bureaucratic quality, low corruption in government, and low risks of
government repudiation of contracts imply that eﬀective rent-seeking must be for
a legitimate cause. In the competition for natural resource rents a large producer
has an edge in his lobbying for subsidies, public support, and lucrative contracts in
natural resource extraction. Hence, production and rent-seeking are complementary
activities when institutions are producer friendly.
Grabber friendly institutions easily divert scarce entrepreneurial resources out of
production and into unproductive activities as there are gains for entrepreneurs from
specialization in unproductive activities. The interplay between entrepreneurial
choice, institutional quality, and resource abundance can be illustrated by a sim-
ple model,20 that starts out from the following premises: a) producers and rent-
grabbers stem from the same limited pool of entrepreneurs; b) the entrepreneurs
allocate themselves between production and grabbing until the return in both al-
ternatives are equal; c) grabbers ﬁght for natural resource rents and feed on the
20Our model builds on relationships developed in Torvik (2002) and Mehlum et al. (2002, 2003,
2005b) and has implications that diﬀer from earlier models of the resource curse. Dutch disease
models, like those by van Wijnbergen (1984), Krugman (1987) and Sachs and Warner (1995)
predict a monotonic relationship between resources and growth (see Torvik 2001 for a discussion
of the Dutch disease models, and Matsen and Torvik 2005 for the optimal intertemporal use of
resource income is such models). Other models explaining the resource curse with rent-seeking,
such as those of Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999) and Torvik (2002) also predict a
monotonic relationship between resource abundance and income. These models explain important
aspects of the resource curse, but they do not explain why resource abundance retards growth in
some countries but not in others.
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Figure 1: The allocation of entrepreneurs
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producers implying that the return to grabbers depend negatively on their num-
ber; d) in production there is joint economies implying that the return to producers
depend positively on their number.
Figure 1 illustrates how the returns to producers and grabbers are related to the
allocation of entrepreneurs. The total length of the horizontal axis is determined
by the total number of entrepreneurs. The number of entrepreneurs that enter
into production is measured from left to right while the number of entrepreneurs
that enter grabbing is measured from right to left. Consider ﬁrst the proﬁts of an
entrepreneur who starts up a productive ﬁrm. The demand for his products depends
on the total income in the economy. If there are few other producers demand is low
and the proﬁtability in production is also low.21 Moreover, by the assumption of
21It is reasonable to assume that higher proﬁts also lead to higher wages. Workers are likely
to gain something when ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase, and higher proﬁts mean higher demand for labor
pushing wages up. Since higher proﬁts imply higher wages, the level of proﬁt in the model may
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a ﬁxed number of entrepreneurs, when the number of producers is large the extent
of grabbing is low. For both reasons the proﬁt cure for producers in Figure 1 is
increasing in the number of producers.
Consider next the proﬁts of a grabber. With many grabbers and few produc-
ers the return to a grabber is low – there are few producers to extort and many
competing grabbers relative to targets. As the number of producers increases and
the number of grabbers falls, there are more targets to extort and less grabbers to
compete with, making proﬁts for the remaining grabbers higher.
We assume that the proﬁt curve for grabbers is steeper than that for producers.
When the number of grabbers increases and the number of producers falls, grabbers
increasingly compete with each other for a limited number of producers. Such
an increased competition for targets is likely to be more harmful for the grabbers
themselves than for the producers, for instance because the ﬁrst grabber to approach
a target may also provide protection against additional grabbers.
At the point where the curves intersect, at E1 in Figure 1, the allocation of en-
trepreneurs between production and grabbing is such that no individual entrepreneur
has incentives to move from grabbing to production, or vice versa. If an entrepreneur
shifts from grabbing to production it induces another entrepreneur to shift from
production to grabbing. Hence, the allocation of entrepreneurs E1 is a stable equi-
librium.
The better the quality of institutions, the less proﬁtable it is to be engaged
in grabbing – better institutions means that proﬁts of grabbing at every level of
production becomes lower. A move towards producer friendly institutions can thus
be represented by a downward shift of the proﬁt curve for grabbers in Figure 1 as
indicated by the dashed line. In the new equilibrium E2 there are more producers
and less grabbers. Note that proﬁts in production as well as in grabbing have
serve as a proxy for the level of income; the higher are proﬁts the higher are income.
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Figure 2: Resource rents with grabber friendly institutions
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gone up. An institutional change that restrains grabbing has the paradoxical result
that grabbers are better oﬀ. The reason for this is that good institutions induce
entrepreneurs to shift from grabbing to production. As a result production and
income in society go up and in the new equilibrium the proﬁts are higher both to
the producers and the remaining grabbers. This result is further strengthened if
better institutions in itself also imply higher proﬁtability in production, shifting the
proﬁt curve to producers upwards in Figure 1.
Grabber friendly institutions : Consider now an economy that discovers a valu-
able natural resource. With completely grabber friendly institutions the resource
provides a new source of income for the grabbers, shifting their proﬁt curve up while
the location of the producers’ proﬁt curve is unchanged. As illustrated in Figure 2,
the new equilibrium E3 has fewer producers, more grabbers, and lower income for
all. Thus we have a resource curse where a higher resource income reduces the total
income – the rent is more than dissipated. The reason for this paradox of plenty
10
is that the reduction in production following the higher natural resource rents re-
duces the opportunity cost of grabbing. First the resource pulls entrepreneurs into
grabbing. Then, as a result, the proﬁts in production go down pushing even more
entrepreneurs into grabbing.
This push eﬀect is seen in Figure 2. Assume that a suﬃcient number of en-
trepreneurs has switched from production to grabbing so that the proﬁt of grabbing
is unchanged - at point A. However, at this point proﬁts in production have fallen
below the original level, and for this reason the proﬁt for a grabber is still higher
than for a producer. Thus, to reestablish equilibrium even more entrepreneurs be-
come grabbers, and the point where proﬁts in grabbing and production are equalized
must be at a lower proﬁt level than the original one.
With bad institutions more resources attracts entrepreneurs into grabbing, fur-
ther undermining the incentives to undertake production. Grabbers generate nega-
tive externalities and producers positive externalities. This explains why the nega-
tive income eﬀect from this reallocation of entrepreneurs dominates the direct posi-
tive income eﬀect of more resources.
Producer friendly institutions: Consider now the opposite case. When institu-
tions are completely producer friendly natural resources provide an additional source
of income for producers, shifting up the proﬁts in production. As seen in Figure
3 after the shift the new equilibrium E4 has more producers and fewer grabbers.
Moreover, the total rise in proﬁts is higher than the natural resource income. The
initial rise in proﬁts for each producer is equal to the distance from E1 to B in Figure
3, while the equilibrium rise in proﬁts for all entrepreneurs is the vertical diﬀerence
between E1 and E4. Since the latter distance E1E4 is larger than E1B, and since all
entrepreneurs receive the proﬁts E4 in equilibrium, the total rise in proﬁts is higher
than the natural resource rent itself.
With producer friendly institutions natural resources stimulate production. With
11
Figure 3: Resource rents with producer friendly institutions
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grabber friendly institutions natural resources hamper production. As there are
positive complementarities between producers there is a multiplier eﬀect so that
any impulse - positive or negative - is ampliﬁed.
Growth paths: As an illustration of the growth implications we compare four hy-
pothetical countries. Countries A and A* are resource poor, with country A having
grabber friendly institutions and country A* having producer friendly institutions.
Countries B and B* are resource abundant, with B having grabber friendly and B*
producer friendly institutions. The four countries have initially the same income
level Y0. As illustrated in Figure 4, of the resource poor countries the one with
producer friendly institutions A* outperforms the country with grabber friendly
institutions A. We have seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3 that, other things equal,
countries with producer friendly institutions converge to a higher income level than
countries with grabber friendly institutions. Thus, in the same way, country B*
outperforms country B.
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Figure 4: Growth paths
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The key thing to note, however, is the diﬀerence in growth paths between the two
countries with producer friendly institutions A* and B*, and the diﬀerence between
the countries with grabber friendly institutions A and B. We have seen in Figure
2 that for countries with bad institutions more natural resources is a curse – more
natural resources push income down. Thus, starting out at the same income level
resource poor country A outperforms resource rich country B. For countries with
good institutions, however, more natural resources is a blessing – the more natural
resources, the higher income will be. Thus the picture is the opposite to that for
countries with bad institutions – starting out at the same income level resource
abundant country B* outgrows resource poor country A*.
In this model resource abundant countries constitute both growth winners and
growth losers. If the model is relevant we should expect to see more diverging
experiences among resource abundant than among resource poor countries.
There may also be additional reasons for why institutions are key to understand-
ing the resource curse than illustrated by our model. A political economy theory
of the resource curse that highlights this is developed by Robinson et al. (2005).
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They construct a model where the costs and beneﬁts of buying votes through inef-
ﬁcient redistribution, for instance by bribing voters by oﬀering them well paid but
unproductive public sector jobs, depend on the interaction between resource income
and institutional quality. With high public resource income and bad institutions the
political incentives to undertake ineﬃcient redistribution are strong. In such a situ-
ation the personal beneﬁts of staying in power are high. More resource income may
increase the extent of ineﬃcient redistribution suﬃciently for aggregate income to
go down. Countries with good institutions, on the other hand, tend to beneﬁt from
resource abundance since these institutions mitigate the perverse political incentives
resource abundance creates.
4 Empirical testing of institutions and the resource curse
In order to test our hypothesis we use the same data and the same methodology
as Sachs and Warner with one addition. We extend their analysis to account for
the potential interaction between resource abundance and institutional quality. The
institutional quality index that we use is an unweighted average of ﬁve indices from
Political Risk Services: rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption in government,
risk of expropriation, and risk of government repudiation of contracts.22
The index runs from one to zero. When the index is zero, there is a weak rule of
law and a high risk of expropriation, malfunctioning bureaucracy, and corruption in
the government; all of which favor grabbers and deter producers. The growth impact
of an increase in resources – the strength of the resource curse – is negative for
most countries. The magnitude of the eﬀect, however, depends on the institutional
quality. The result from Mehlum et al. (2005b) can be summarized in the following
key equation, where the left hand side is the derivative of the growth rate with
22A more detailed description of the index is provided by Knack and Keefer (1995).
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respect to the share of resource exports in national income:
d [growth]
d [resource abundance]
= −14.34 + 15.40 [institutional quality]
We see that the resource curse is weaker the higher the institutional quality. The
interaction term is highly signiﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.017. Moreover, for countries
with high institutional quality (higher than the threshold 14.34/15.40 = 0.93) the
resource curse does not apply. Among the 87 countries in the sample, 15 have
the institutional quality suﬃcient to nullify the resource curse. Thus, institutional
quality is the key to understanding the resource curse: When institutions are bad,
resource abundance is a growth curse; when institutions are good resource abundance
is a blessing.
That the resource curse depends on institutional quality has been conﬁrmed
robust to a number of speciﬁcations in Mehlum et al. (2005b), including controls for
the level of human capital and ethnic fractionalization. Also, the result holds when
excluding all African countries. Thus the connection between the resource curse and
institutional quality is not an artifact stemming from systematic diﬀerences between
African and Non-African countries.
One possible critique of our result is that resource abundance might be correlated
with some measure of underdevelopment not included in our analysis. For instance,
underdevelopment can be associated with specialization in agricultural exports, and
this may drive the empirical results. Our mechanism of resource grabbing is less
likely to apply in agrarian societies, as land is less lootable and taxable than most
natural resources. However, using an alternative resource measure that concentrate
on lootable resources, the share of mineral production in national income, our result
15
is strengthened:
d [growth]
d [mineral abundance]
= −17.71 + 29.43 [institutional quality]
The regression result shows that the direct negative eﬀect of natural resources be-
comes stronger and that the interaction eﬀect increases substantially. Since resources
that are easily lootable appear to be particularly harmful for growth in countries
with weak institutions, our grabbing story receives additional support. The thresh-
old level of institutional quality that nulliﬁes the resource curse falls from 0.93 to
0.60, implying that 33 out of the 87 countries in our sample have an institutional
quality suﬃcient to avoid the resource curse.23
5 Concluding remarks
Countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth win-
ners. Our hypothesis is that the main reasons for these diverging experiences are
diﬀerences in the quality of institutions. With grabber friendly institutions we have
seen that more natural resources push aggregate income down, while with producer
friendly institutions more natural resources increase income. Our main hypothesis
– that only countries with grabber friendly institutions are captured by the resource
curse, while countries with producer friendly institutions escape the resource curse –
is conﬁrmed by using the same data that Sachs and Warner earlier claimed showed
a robust negative association between resource abundance and growth.
Our theory, that shows how countries with diﬀerent institutions react diﬀerently
to higher resource income, explains why one observes such huge diﬀerences in re-
source abundant countries. Taking into account that institutions may be endogenous
to resource income is likely to strengthen this divergent pattern even more – if insti-
23See Boschini et al. (2004) for more detailed analysis on diﬀerent types of resources and their
interaction with institutions.
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tutions are easier to dismantle when they are bad in the ﬁrst place, countries with
a low institutional quality face a double burden. More resources decreases income
when institutions are grabber friendly, and this eﬀect is reinforced if institutions
become even worse than they where in the ﬁrst place.
Institutions are decisive regardless of whether they are endogenous to resource
income or not. Nevertheless, the eﬀect of resource abundance on institutional quality
is a challenging area of future research. A worrying feature of the data currently
used to discuss this is that they show large variations in countries over quite limited
periods of time – while one would think that the quality of institutions changed only
very slowly. This accentuates the problem of reverse causality and omitted variables.
If people tend to think that institutions and policy are bad when times are bad,
and vice versa, the measures of institutional quality is endogenous to the economic
situation. In that case there is a tendency for the share of resource exports in GDP
– the most used measure of resource abundance – to go up and for institutional
measures to worsen when growth is bad. But this is not the same as saying that
resource abundance causes bad institutions. A main priority of future research
should be to unravel the causality between (the measures of) resource abundance
and the quality of institutions, and to check more carefully for omitted variables.
Whether resource abundance leads to institutional decay or not is not a key ques-
tion in our explanation of the curse, however. In our theory, even when institutions
are completely persistent and therefore unaﬀected by the discovery of new natural
resources such as oil and natural gas, the quality of these institutions are decisive.
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